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Abstract. This paper examines the interaction between 
transportation policy and climate change policy in two Ca-
nadian provinces, British Columbia and Ontario. The con-
cept of policy capacity is used to qualitatively measure the 
effectiveness of instruments in advancing goals in an area 
where established policy paradigms may not be congruent 
with new initiatives. A review of official policy documents 
and budgetary information on policy-related spending, as 
well as primary interviews with policy managers in relevant 
provincial ministries, reveals that overlapping policy goals 
and instruments may have created a situation of institution-
alized policy inhibition, in which conflicting layers of policy 
goals and instruments constrain the available policy capaci-
ty. 
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Résumé. Cet article examine l’interaction entre la politique 
du transport et la politique de lutte contre le changement 
climatique dans deux provinces canadiennes, la Colombie 
britannique et l’Ontario. Le concept de capacité d’analyse 
des politiques publiques est utilisé pour mesurer qualitati-
vement l’efficacité d’instruments afin de faire progresser des 
objectifs dans un domaine où les paradigmes courants ne 
sont pas compatibles avec des initiatives nouvelles. Un exa-
men de documents officiels de politiques publiques et 
d’information budgétaire sur des dépenses liées à ces poli-
tiques révèle que des objectifs et instruments de politiques 
publiques se chevauchant ont pu créer une situation 
d’inhibition institutionnalisée, dans laquelle des strates 
contradictoires d’objectifs et d’instruments de politiques 
publiques limitent la capacité disponible d’élaboration de 
politiques publiques. 
 
Mots clefs. capacité d’élaboration de politiques publiques; 
changement climatique; transport; strates politiques; Proto-
cole de Kyoto 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the 1970s, when Theodore Lowi (1972) famously high-
lighted the reciprocal interaction between public policy and 
politics, public policy scholars have been faced with the 
challenge of developing an effective - and non-linear - expla-
nation of the policy-politics relationship. Early attempts to 
understand how policy influences politics (and vice versa), 
such as those offered by Heclo (1974) or Kingdon (1984), 
have since been refined and improved, or even superseded, 
by more intricate theories of authoritative dynamics in the 
policy process. 1  Recent studies have revealed particular 
dynamics of the public policy cycle that can influence the 
oscillation between policy and politics, highlighting the mul-
tiple dimensions of policy goals and instruments (eg. 
Cashore and Howlett, 2007). These more complex formula-
tions of the policy process underscore the insights to be 
gained by advancing beyond linear models of policy, which 
frequently attempt to describe analytical and deliberative 
efforts in terms of a single dimension. 
One complicating, but increasingly relevant problem 
faced by theories of the policy process is how to analyze cases 
where alternative policy frameworks interact. This problem 
is inadequately addressed in the public policy literature to 
date. Cross-cutting issues, like climate change adaptation 
and mitigation, raise ample opportunities for policy subsys-
tem interactions, since they present policy problems that 
span multiple issue areas and thus call for an integrated set 
of goals that will enable pursuit of cohesive objectives. Be-
cause of the presence of multiple issues and interwoven 
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policy challenges, it is unlikely that an overarching theory of 
the policy process such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(Sabatier, 1988) or the Institutional Analysis and Develop-
ment Framework (Ostrom, 2007) will be sufficient to deliver 
an explanation of policy development that can account for 
these kinds of interactions. More likely, a useful explanation 
will rely on some multi-dimensional framework that can give 
full weight to the effects of policy layering on large scale 
social and economic transitions (Kern and Howlett, 2009). 
Such an approach could be particularly illuminating in the 
effort to assess Canada’s capacity for policies that can ad-
vance climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
This paper examines the interaction between transporta-
tion policy - one of Canada’s earliest established policy do-
mains2 - and climate change policy in two Canadian provinc-
es. We will use the concept of policy capacity to qualitatively 
measure the effectiveness of instruments in advancing goals 
in an area where established policy paradigms may not be 
congruent with new initiatives. A review of official policy 
documents and budgetary information on policy-related 
spending, as well as primary interviews with policy managers 
in relevant provincial ministries, has revealed that the over-
lapping policy goals and instruments (newer climate change 
policy goals and instruments layered on top of older trans-
portation goals and instruments) may have created a situa-
tion of institutionalized policy inhibition, in which conflicting 
layers of policy goals and instruments sharply constrain the 
available policy capacity. 
More specifically, we find that the twenty-year elabora-
tion of a transportation policy paradigm has elevated market 
principles - such as increased private sector engagement, 
freer competition, and deregulation - into core beliefs and 
principles that guide policy implementation. These core 
principles have created an inhibition to deploy certain policy 
instruments that have been adopted in jurisdictions that 
have become global leaders in climate action.3  To maximize 
the chances for success, climate policy requires taxing and 
pricing mechanisms, legislated greenhouse gas emissions 
targets, and stricter regulation, which would all work to 
orient the market. If policy makers in Canada are to success-
fully address climate challenges, they will likely have to over-
come some of these transport policy inhibitions. 
 
What is Policy Capacity 
 
“Policy capacity” or “policy analytical capacity” attempts to 
describe the link between policy development at the bureau-
cratic level and policy decisions taken by elected and ap-
pointed government officials. While this concept is not new 
(see Perl and White, 2002 for example), it has received an 
increasing amount of attention, mostly (but not exclusively) 
from Canadian authors, in recent years (e.g. Edwards 2009; 
Howlett 2009; Wellstead and Stedman, 2010). It is a neces-
sarily subjective concept, but some attempts to quantify it 
have begun to advance policy insight (see Howlett and New-
man, 2010, for example). The subjectivity of the concept is, 
in part, softened by considering policy capacity from the 
viewpoint of those who pursue it firsthand: government 
policy analysts, the civil servants involved in policy develop-
ment and planning, and elected and appointed government 
officials.4   To this end, direct interview techniques were 
necessary to gather data on policy capacity. 
In the past, “policy capacity” has sometimes been used to 
refer to a state’s ability to govern, in the context of the recent 
propensity of some governments to favour alternative service 
delivery mechanisms, austerity measures, and styles of pub-
lic administration that mimic private sector corporations 
(e.g. Peters, 1996; Bakvis, 2000). However, a more precise 
term for this might be “state capacity”, “governing capacity” 
or even “governance capacity”. Policy capacity, by contrast, 
reflects the ability of civil servants to produce useful advice 
and to effectively communicate that advice to government 
decision-makers.  
Many scholars agree that measuring policy capacity is 
most effective when it is focused on policy inputs and not 
policy outputs. The provincial auditor of Manitoba wrote in a 
2001 report on policy capacity: “It is important to clarify at 
the outset that our review examines capacity; it does not in 
any way assess or question the merit of government policies” 
(Provincial Auditor, 2001: 4). In addition, the interview 
respondents from this Manitoba report as well as interview-
ees from other studies (eg. Rasmussen, 1999) saw policy 
inputs as most pertinent when attempting to calibrate the 
degree of policy capacity. Howlett (2009: 162) makes the 
distinction between “policy capacity”, which covers the whole 
gamut of policy-making from formulation to implementa-
tion, and “policy analytical capacity”, which focuses in on the 
part of the policy cycle where planning, research, advising 
and decision-making are being pursued (and not implemen-
tation or any kind of street-level bureaucracy). For the most 
part, when we talk about policy capacity we are referring to 
analytical capacity (i.e. formulation and not implementa-
tion).5 
Several authors (Howlett and Oliphant, 2010: 20-21; In-
stitute on Governance, 2010: 9; Provincial Auditor, 2001: 16; 
Anderson, 1996: 472; Riddell, 1998: 5) discuss factors that 
might be considered components of policy capacity. These 
mainly boil down to levels of effort or inherent capability in: 
– personnel (i.e. education, job experience, technical 
research skills) 
– innovative leadership in policy management 
– long term prioritizing and strategic planning 
– vertical communication between policy analysts and 
managers6 
– horizontal communication and coordination be-
tween policy units and across departments 
– access to IT, information, and analytical tools (like 
databases or clinical research or published reports 
from other countries etc.) 
Empirical research has yielded some conclusions about 
the state of policy capacity in democratic governments. Poli-
cy managers in the civil service, whose job it is to develop 
and produce policy recommendations for governments, have 
reported that having educated and skilled policy analysts is 
paramount (Provincial Auditor, 2001). Likewise, vertical 
communication has been reported as an important factor in 
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achieving adequate policy capacity (Rasmussen, 1999). In 
addition, respondents of survey and interview research have 
suggested that better technology (in the form of database and 
other IT resources) would help them improve policy capacity 
(Provincial Auditor, 2001). Implicit in these studies is the 
notion that policy capacity in current civil services is not 
always adequate for the effective production and communi-
cation of policy advice.7   
In the present study, we explore the policy capacity of 
civil servants in the transportation sector in two Canadian 
provinces: British Columbia and Ontario. We propose that 
these civil servants are faced with an institutionalized inhibi-
tion in developing effective policy advice on climate change 
mitigation that can be incorporated into the policy options 
that have already been ratified by elected officials. The re-
sulting incapacity is the result of relatively recent ideas and 
approaches related to the newer climate action issue area 
having been layered on top of an established policy paradigm 
which had become institutionalized in the transportation 
sector at least a decade earlier.  
The recent policy goals of climate action and the estab-
lished transportation goals - as well as the prospective policy 
instruments of climate action and the established instru-
ments of transportation - thus far lack a compatible fit, re-
sulting in policy layering (Kern and Howlett, 2009). Layered 
policies create a particular bureaucratic constraint in which 
certain policy instruments are judged to be incompatible 
with established policy goals. This presents a significant 
challenge in both of the provinces we have investigated, 
where governments have elevated climate action to a more 
prominent position on their policy agenda. 
 
Why BC and Ontario present a good  
opportunity to examine climate capacity in 
transport policy 
 
Climate change has become an issue that has made it onto 
the political agenda in every Canadian jurisdiction. As of 
2009, all 10 provinces and the federal government had offi-
cial greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (Snoddon 
and Wigle, 2009: 5). However, only four Canadian provinces 
have to date enacted substantive legislation that opens the 
door for public sector initiatives on climate change. The four 
jurisdictions that have moved beyond exhortation and into 
substantive policy development include British Columbia, 
Québec, Ontario, and Manitoba. Legislated climate action 
will mean that policy initiatives in that area will have a high-
er priority, which increases the need to coordinate climate 
policy with other policy domains. 
British Columbia’s suite of climate legislation is by far the 
most comprehensive and also the most precisely targeted. 
BC’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Act of 2007 has 
detailed quantitative targets for greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction. BC has also passed the Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
(Cap And Trade) Act of 2008. Although this law is largely 
not in force yet, it is scheduled to become active in 2012. 
Québec has the next most detailed climate action legisla-
tion with its Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement (2009). 
This law does not set any firm targets, but it does require 
greenhouse gas emissions reporting by industry and it also 
empowers the Minister of the Environment to set targets and 
implement a plan of action, which is, however, not legislated. 
There is, in addition, a very detailed carbon trading frame-
work in this law, but it is not yet in force.8 
Manitoba also has legislated quantitative greenhouse gas 
targets. The Manitoba legislature enacted The Climate 
Change and Emissions Reductions Act in 2008, and it also 
includes the quantitative targets. However, in the subsequent 
sections it gives the Minister of the Environment (now “Min-
ister of Conservation”) a fair amount of flexibility in setting 
new targets. The law does not specify if the new targets are to 
be more or less strict than the initial target, leaving some 
ambiguity regarding the numbers in this piece of legislation. 
Ontario, on the other hand, has taken a different ap-
proach. Despite having enacted legislation to address climate 
change specifically, Ontario’s Green Energy Act of 2009 
contains no comparable numerical (or even qualitative) 
objectives. It merely sets up a framework under which the 
provincial government could legislate quantitative targets if 
it chose to do so in the future.9 Nonetheless, there is reason 
to view Ontario as answerable to a specific climate action 
policy commitment, found in other legislation. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Act originally enacted in 1990, but 
amended several times, as recently as 2010, for example, also 
does not set quantitative targets but does allow the govern-
ment to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, including the use 
of a carbon trading system.10 Ontario also has an Environ-
mental Bill of Rights, which it enacted in 1993, but amended 
as recently as 2009. One of the 2009 amendments raised the 
profile of climate mitigation performance: 
s.58.2	  (1)	  The	  Environmental	  Commissioner	  shall	  report	  an-­‐nually	  to	  the	  Speaker	  of	  the	  Assembly	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  ac-­‐tivities	   in	  Ontario	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases,	  and	  the	  Speaker	  shall	  lay	  the	  report	  before	  the	  Assembly	  as	  soon	  as	  reasonably	  possible.	  
Section 58.2 also empowers the Environmental Commis-
sioner to oversee reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, 
which gives the regime a measure of independence that could 
increase the government’s accountability on this file.  
However, not all of these provinces are ideal candidates 
for this study. In fact, there is one very compelling reason to 
exclude the province of Québec. Québec is one of only two 
Canadian provinces that do not produce any oil or natural 
gas.11 This could change, if and when Québec starts exploit-
ing its shale gas deposits, but the debate over a policy frame-
work that could enable such production is only just begin-
ning (see Moore, 2011). Oil and gas production account for a 
major proportion of greenhouse gas emissions: in 2006, 
Canada’s emissions from the fossil fuels production indus-
tries generated 158 megatons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2eq) - 
21.9% - second only to the transportation sector with 159 
MtCO2eq, at 22% (Environment Canada, 2008: 31). With the 
emissions attributable to fossil fuel production representing 
such a large and increasing share of the country’s total emis-
sions (see ibid.: 28), energy is clearly a sector whose impact 
on greenhouse gas emissions and on climate action in gen-
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eral can simply not be ignored. The exclusion of Québec is 
therefore justified here because the absence of a gas or oil 
industry in that province makes climate change policy for-
mulation and implementation substantively different than it 
would be in Ontario or BC. At the very least, Québec’s cli-
mate action policy debate exists in a different context than 
that of the other jurisdictions. 
Manitoba was also excluded from our study, but for dif-
ferent reasons. Like BC, Québec and Ontario, Manitoba has 
shown a willingness to participate in inter-jurisdictional 
efforts to combat climate change, including by becoming a 
founding partner of the now moribund Western Climate 
Initiative.12  It has specific climate change legislation, as 
noted above. However: neither the 2008 Climate Change 
and Emissions Reductions Act nor the 1987 Environment 
Act, amended in 2009 to include climate change considera-
tions and greenhouse gas definitions,13 provides for any kind 
of cap-and-trade or carbon emissions trading framework. 
According to several of the policy professionals interviewed 
for this study, carbon pricing mechanisms and in particular, 
carbon trading, are seen as the most effective and easily 
accepted instruments for achieving provincial emissions 
reduction targets. Therefore, if Manitoba has not legislated 
its commitment to what is seen by many as the single most 
promising category of climate action policy instruments 
available to North American jurisdictions, then it is not yet 
operating within the same policy framework as neighbouring 
political jurisdictions that have launched substantive climate 
action initiatives. 
We will thus focus in on British Columbia and Ontario in 
the present study, because they are the only two jurisdictions 
that have enacted climate change legislation, produce oil and 
gas, and aspire to participate in inter-jurisdictional climate 
efforts, and have laws that at the very least allow the gov-
ernment to activate a carbon emissions trading scheme. It 
could be argued that these are the two jurisdictions that have 
taken the most initiative to date in legislated actions to ad-
dress climate change in Canada’s evolving policy context. 
At present, we do not consider the federal government to 
be a leading policy actor in advancing climate change policy 
that influences the transportation sector. Federal govern-
ment action is constrained by NAFTA and other forces of 
continentalization in our political economy (Cohen, 1996; 
Clarkson, 2002; McBride, 2003). The strategy apparent in 
Ottawa suggests that Canada should not formulate national 
climate policy until the US does so, because such a policy 
would be unenforceable and uncompetitive in the absence of 
a US policy (Sawyer and Fischer, 2010). The other provinces 
(besides those noted above) have either taken a “wait and 
see” approach, or passed hortatory legislation that does not 
set specific targets for greenhouse gas reduction, so their 
influence at this time is most likely to have the effect of con-
straining climate policy capacity through their unwillingness 
to participate in collective action (Snoddon and Wigle, 2009: 
6). Saskatchewan, for example, has passed an extensive 
climate change bill through its legislature, but has suspended 
the bill indefinitely. 
Once a climate protection policy has been enacted, the 
transport sector must become a major part of the mitigation 
and/or adaptation efforts, since transport is either the big-
gest or second biggest greenhouse gas emitter in Canada14 
(Environment Canada, 2008: 7). 15  However, reconciling 
climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts to the exist-
ing transport policy paradigm may pose significant challeng-
es. Transportation policy in both BC and Ontario is exten-
sively developed, and ideas about the role of state and mar-
ket that were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s have ad-
vanced well beyond the implementation stage of the policy 
cycle. Transportation policy programs in both provinces have 
established goals that embrace industry deregulation, in-
creased market competition, roadway expansion, transit 
infrastructure megaprojects, and public-private partnerships 
- all policies that were ratified 10 or more years ago. On the 
other hand, in both of our case study jurisdictions, climate 
policy is very much still in the policy formulation stage - or at 
the very furthest, in the decision-making stage - of the policy 
cycle,16 since according to our interview subjects, climate 
action initiatives have really only been on the policy agenda 
since 2007. 
Although they have taken some actions that contribute to 
climate policy, transportation departments find themselves 
largely reactive to climate policy initiatives from other gov-
ernment departments – mainly by providing data or fore-
casts about climate impacts and possible mitigation and 
adaptation measures. In this sense, the newer climate action 
policies are being layered over the older, established para-
digm of provincial transportation departments. This is more 
likely to introduce policy instrument choices that are incon-
sistent with established policies and programs (Kern and 
Howlett, 2009). Yet avoiding such tools and techniques can 
lead to incoherent policy in which goals are not aligned with 
the means to attain them. This disconnect will be the focus of 
our next section. 
 
Transport and climate change policy para-
digms in BC and Ontario 
 
The policy paradigm guiding the transportation sector in 
Canada was dramatically altered following release of the 
1985 federal government white paper “Freedom to Move: A 
Framework for Transportation Reform” (Mazankowski, 
1985). This report, which became the basis for the 1987 
National Transportation Act, established that competition 
in an open market between private carriers should be the 
federal government’s top priority in transportation policy. 
This represented a major break from the previous 120 years 
of federal transportation policy, under which public financial 
support of infrastructure development, public enterprise, 
subsidies for private carriers and strict economic regulation 
of the industry were the preferred policy instruments (Grat-
wick, 2001: 2). 
The “Freedom to Move” white paper was unequivocal in 
promoting deregulation of the transportation sector, espe-
cially trucking and rail. There were repeated references to a 
need to reduce regulation and encourage competition in 
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transportation, to removing barriers of entry to the market-
place, and to doing away with monopolistic practices - even 
where crown corporations were concerned. The report called 
for new legislation to take down regulatory obstacles to com-
petition in the transportation marketplace, replacing the 
traditional public interest as expressed through a “public 
convenience and necessity” test for market entry with a more 
competitive orientation, in the form of a “fit, willing and 
able” test. In essence, the 1985 report and the subsequent 
1987 Act heralded Canada’s shift from an era in which gov-
ernment intervention was a frequent mode of policy imple-
mentation to one in which the government initiative in the 
transport sector was much reduced.  
These principles of deregulation and open market compe-
tition have solidified into an institutionalized federal trans-
portation policy paradigm. The current transportation legis-
lation, now called the Canada Transportation Act,17 retains 
both the language of the 1987 Act and the spirit of the 1985 
white paper. For instance, section 5 of the current Act de-
clares that the objectives of federal transportation policy “are 
most likely to be achieved when...competition and market 
forces, both within and among the various modes of trans-
portation, are the prime agents in providing viable and effec-
tive transportation services.” For the past 25 years, increased 
market competition and decreased government regulation 
have become the core principles of federal-level policy in 
transportation. This is evidenced by the sale of crown corpo-
rations in the sector, including Air Canada and Canadian 
National Railways; the commercialization of major airports; 
and the use of public-private partnerships (P3s) in develop-
ing new infrastructure, such as in the construction and oper-
ation of the Confederation Bridge link between Prince Ed-
ward Island and New Brunswick. Evidence of the entrench-
ment of this policy paradigm can be found in its continuation 
after successive changes of prime minister and parties in 
power.  
Following Ottawa’s lead over the last 15 years, BC and 
Ontario have applied the federal policy paradigm in their 
own jurisdictions over the transport sector. Their approach 
during this time has been to increase market autonomy and 
decrease government intervention. Materially, this has mani-
fested itself in the sale of provincial crown assets, such as BC 
Rail; increasing use of P3s for infrastructure development, 
including the Sea-to-Sky Highway connecting Vancouver and 
Whistler and Ontario’s Highway 407; private operation of 
public transit, such as in North York’s Viva Transit system or 
Vancouver’s Canada Line; BC’s commercialized management 
of its coastal ferry system; and Ontario’s outsourcing of some 
major administrative duties, such as the GO Transit fare 
system maintenance and provincial driver examination 
services (Ontario, 2006). Changes to the language used in 
public documents reflect this shifting policy paradigm, as 
they increasingly talk about “value for money” and refer to 
their target audience as customers rather than citizens (see 
for example, British Columbia, 1996: 4; Wright, 2001: 2). 
It is noteworthy that partisanship does not appear to be a 
factor in the market-oriented language of policy papers pub-
lished by these two transportation ministries over the last 15 
years. The same emphasis on deregulation, lower levels of 
government intervention, and promotion of market competi-
tion appears in documents released by the right-of-centre 
Progressive Conservatives in Ontario from 1995-2003 and by 
the left-of-centre NDP government in BC from 1995-2001. In 
British Columbia from 2001 right up to the present, the 
centrist provincial Liberal government has made extensive 
use of market ideology and its associated slogans, such as 
“slashing red tape” (British Columbia 2005: 9) and “devel-
opment of partnerships with the private sector” (British 
Columbia, 2003: 8) in all of its publicly-available transporta-
tion documents. This promotion of market principles in 
transportation, and its non-partisan character, illustrate the 
depth of the entrenchment of this policy paradigm. 
The centrist Liberal government of Ontario has not used 
this kind of language in its transportation policy documents 
and annual reports since it came to power in 2003. This is 
likely due to a perceived political advantage acquired by 
distancing themselves from their unpopular Progressive 
Conservative predecessors. However, despite these issues of 
presentation, Ontario has not introduced new transportation 
regulations or modified its position on the importance of 
market competition in the transportation sector. In practice, 
the current government appears committed to the policy 
paradigm, including legislation and private-sector partner-
ships, that was established before it came to power. 
This current transportation policy paradigm has been in-
stitutionalized, through financial agreements and regulatory 
precedents, into a well established framework which orients 
future policy choices. Transportation policy options in BC 
and Ontario are developed to advance goals of improving 
market competition, increasing private carrier revenues, and 
decreasing government intervention. This is apparent in 
current practice, such as BC’s implementation of its Gateway 
Program, which involves roadway expansion to support the 
growth of port commerce. In addition, our interview subjects 
were unanimous in their acceptance of the transport sector’s 
market-oriented policy paradigm, suggesting a fully en-
trenched paradigm that even senior officials do not question. 
As one interview subject put it, “the provincial government’s 
number one goal is moving people and goods around to 
facilitate economic growth and development. This is the 
‘economic imperative’ ”. 
Compared to transportation, climate change is a relative-
ly recent policy concern. Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
in 2002, but since then, the federal government has back-
tracked on its initial commitments, and between 2002 and 
2007, provincial governments made virtually no advances on 
the climate change file (Rabe, 2007). BC’s “Climate Action 
Plan” was not released until 2008, and “Go Green: Ontario's 
Action Plan on Climate Change” was published in 2007. As 
mentioned above, BC and Ontario have established carbon 
trading regimes but have not implemented them, as they 
await progress at the interprovincial and international level, 
and other options, like carbon tax mechanisms, are still 
being adjusted. In other words, these governments are still in 
the process of developing an effective set of policy instru-
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ments to address climate change. A policy paradigm in this 
area has not yet become established. 
Undeterred by their relative inexperience in the area, 
both BC and Ontario have publicly declared their intentions 
to pursue aggressive climate targets. BC has legislated targets 
that reduce carbon emission to 33% below 2007 levels by 
2020 and 80% below these levels by 2050. Ontario has con-
sistently claimed it will attempt to achieve 15% below 1990 
emissions levels by 2020 and attain reductions of 80% below 
1990 levels by 2050 (Ontario, 2007: 6; Ontario, 2008). The-
se are indeed ambitious targets, considering that between 
2002 and 2006, even after Canada had pledged its commit-
ment to the Kyoto Protocol, Canadian greenhouse gas emis-
sions continued to rise (Marshall, 2006: 1). 
More to the point, between 2002 and 2006, while carbon 
emissions were rising, provincial governments largely main-
tained a hands-off attitude towards climate policy (Marshall, 
2006: 3). In other words, without government intervention 
of any kind, the private sector was unable or unwilling to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address climate change 
on its own. Globally, this has been analogous to the weaker 
climate change mitigation and adaptation results of develop-
ing nations, who do not have the financial or other resources 
to enforce climate policy (Bodansky, 2010). Successful cli-
mate change strategies will require further government 
action (Ontario, 2007).  
This presents a challenge for policy makers who deal with 
climate change strategies in the transportation sector. On the 
one hand, the established policy paradigm in transportation 
is one of lower government intervention, minimal regulation, 
free market competition, private sector autonomy, and alter-
native service delivery. On the other hand, without govern-
ment intervention to enforce emissions limits, subsidize the 
launch of alternative energy technologies, and regulate fuel 
standards, climate action appears sharply constrained. Policy 
makers must somehow reconcile the demands of climate 
change policy with the institutionalized paradigm that priori-
tizes market-friendly policy instruments in the transporta-
tion sector. This may yet prove difficult in an environment 
where effective regulation of the transportation industry has 
been dramatically reduced, where Crown assets have been 
divested, and where key segments of new road infrastructure 
is under private management. In a further confounding step, 
transportation deregulation in Canada has led to harmoniza-
tion with American transport policies (Madar, 2000: 9), 
which would make an aggressive climate change program 
near impossible without the collaboration of US border 
states or possibly even their federal government. 
The nexus of climate change and transportation is the re-
sult of the collision of two different policy areas - policy areas 
that may or may not have compatible goals, but that, in 
Canada at any rate, call for employing conflicting policy 
instruments. In the public policy literature, very little atten-
tion is given to explanations of policy drivers in situations 
where layered policy paradigms co-exist. Because climate 
change is a cross-cutting issue that affects such disparate 
industries as forestry, residential waste management, and 
cement production among others, it is unlikely that newer 
climate change goals and policy instruments will align 
smoothly with the established goals and instruments that 
exist in transportation. 
Kern and Howlett (2009) posit two dimensions along 
which colliding policy issue areas can be examined: goals and 
instruments, both of which can be either aligned or not 
aligned.18 Therefore there are four possible states of exist-
ence when two policy areas (such as transportation and 
climate change, for example) come into contact: “replace-
ment”, in which the goals in the two policy areas are aligned, 
and the policy instruments in the two areas are also aligned; 
“conversion”, in which goals in the two policy areas are 
aligned but the instruments are not; “drift”, where instru-
ments are aligned between the different policy areas but the 
goals are not; and lastly, “layering”, where neither goals nor 
instruments are aligned. 
The intersection of transportation and climate change 
policy likely fall under the category of policy “layering”. The 
main goal of transportation policy is to move people and 
goods, for various reasons which are not usually considered 
in policy making. The main goal for climate change policy is 
to reduce carbon emissions. At their most basic level, these 
two goals are inherently incompatible, as illustrated by the 
simplest strategy for reducing emissions which would be to 
limit mobility.19 And as has been discussed above, the policy 
instruments in the two areas are considerably different in 
their logic of authority: climate action relies on some new 
form of government action, whereas the currently prevailing 
transportation policy paradigm calls for as little government 
intervention as possible. 
In a layered situation, attempts to use instruments from 
the newer policy area, such as regulated tailpipe emissions 
standards, may meet with resistance from the entrenched 
policy paradigm, such as a trucking industry that is largely 
deregulated. Such differences are institutionalized, meaning 
that they are hard-wired into the organizational structures, 
formal roles and responsibilities, and/or the organizational 
culture of the transport policy subsystem.  
Earlier, we defined policy capacity as the ability of civil 
servants to create and communicate quality policy advice to 
elected officials. The capacity of policy advisors working on 
climate action initiatives in the transportation sector will be 
constrained as a result of conflict produced by the layering of 
climate change goals over the existing transport policy in-
struments. This makes for what we have labeled an “institu-
tionalized inhibition” in climate mitigation and adaptation 
within the subsystem – meaning that the policy capacity of 
subsystem actors to implement policy is constrained in ways 
that are resistant to informal adaptation, and cannot be 
applied formally without addressing paradigmatic tensions. 
 
Mandates and Resources 
The institutionalized inhibition that results from the interac-
tion of an entrenched transportation policy paradigm with 
the newer demands of climate change adaptation and mitiga-
tion efforts, as described above, affects policy capacity at the 
macro-level of the transportation policy subsystem. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the professional competencies of 
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individual policy analysts, the challenges of staffing policy 
units, and the purchase and maintenance of specialized 
information technologies and research tools can be consid-
ered to be the policy capacity constraints at the micro-level. 
In between, at the meso-level, there is the tension between 
the variable demands of a ministry’s changing policy man-
date and the availability of resources to match those de-
mands. In some ways, the influence of meso-level issues can 
rival macro-level effects in importance on assessments of 
policy capacity. 
The ability of a ministry to keep up with changing policy 
mandates by applying the appropriate level of resources is a 
key component of policy capacity building. Mandates and 
resources can rise or decline, and when they do not move in 
the same direction there will likely be consequences for 
policy capacity. Thus there are four areas of activity for a 
government ministry faced with these challenges (see Figure 
1): 
 
Figure 1. Criteria for Assessing Policy Capacity: Mandates and 
Resources 
 
 
Resources 
Increase Stable or  Decrease 
Mandates 
Increase 
Challenging 
environment met 
by augmented 
policy analytical 
capacity 
Likely ineffective 
policy capacity 
characterized by 
short-term fire-
fighting 
Stable or 
Decrease 
Enhanced policy 
capacity to meet 
long-term chal-
lenges 
 
Weak policy 
analytical capacity 
contributing to 
propensity for 
policy failures 
 
Source: Craft and Howlett, 2011 
 
The term mandate is not currently a technical expression in 
the academic literature that deals with policy capacity. 
Where “mandate” is used, it is loosely referred to in its 
standard dictionary definition, as the areas in which a par-
ticular ministry or department is operating. We use mandate 
rather than jurisdiction here because “mandate” implies that 
a government department is being allowed or directed to 
pursue a particular policy path by a higher authority (i.e. the 
cabinet or executive, legislation, or popular will), rather than 
viewing a government department or even its associated 
cabinet minister as being able to write its own rules or to set 
its own policy direction. This is an important distinction, as 
recognizing that a given ministry may not be ultimately in 
control of its policy direction is crucial for a complete under-
standing of the tension between mandates and resources. 
Government departments cannot unilaterally adjust their 
policy decisions to match their available resources.  
This is equally true in the Canadian political context, 
where ministries and departments do not set their own poli-
cy parameters. Schacter (1999: 4) identifies six drivers of 
executive policy direction for Canadian governments: 
– the personal priorities of the prime minister or 
premier 
– preferences of ministers and cabinet 
– the “size and scope of government operations” 
– the “nature of the policy challenges facing the gov-
ernment” 
– financial considerations 
– public opinion   
And while exogenous factors like public opinion and fi-
nancial constraints must be taken into consideration, the 
majority of scholars of Canadian government agree that 
executives - more and more frequently dominated by their 
first ministers - are exclusively responsible for setting policy 
direction for each and every one of their government’s minis-
tries and agencies (Mallory, 1984; Ward, 1987; Savoie, 1999). 
While Weller (2003) argues that Westminster-derived execu-
tives can be sometimes dominated by a first minister and at 
other times are capable of collective decision-making, this 
distinction is immaterial for the present discussion, as the 
fact remains that in Canada’s state tradition, executive deci-
sion-making is largely conducted in secret, and the authors 
of specific policy directives are never identified. 
The policy “mandate” of a particular ministry is therefore 
understood as the direction given to it by its associated exec-
utive, whether that be through the collective decision of 
cabinet or the sole authority of the prime minister or prem-
ier. It is the scope, scale, and domain of activities in which a 
ministry is directed to operate. We therefore take the per-
spective that a ministry’s mandate is a set of instructions that 
any one minister or ministerial official cannot alter unilater-
ally. 
British Columbia’s and Ontario’s transportation policy 
mandates have changed over the past 10 to 15 years. In a 
broad sense, both provinces’ transportation ministries are 
still principally occupied with the same policy domains that 
they have consistently pursued for the last 50 years: high-
ways, the trucking industry, public transit, rail administra-
tion, inland waterways, and rural airports (and in BC, espe-
cially in the last 40 years, coastal ferries and driver insur-
ance). However, both BC’s and Ontario’s provincial minis-
tries of transportation have experienced significant changes 
in how they approach policy formulation and implementa-
tion in these areas. For one thing, the shift to deregulation 
and increased market competition in transportation, as 
described above, can be seen as a major change in policy 
mandate, requiring a reorientation of ministry priorities and 
resources. More recently, legislative enactments establishing 
new climate change goals in both BC and Ontario have 
placed increasing responsibilities on these provinces’ minis-
tries of transportation in what must necessarily be viewed as 
a major change in policy mandate.  
In British Columbia, “climate change” was first men-
tioned in the Ministry of Transportation’s Annual Report for 
fiscal year 1998-1999 as one of the “key areas affecting the 
ministry” on matters related to the environment (British 
Columbia, 1999: 7). However, by 2006-2007, climate change 
94 Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2012, 87-99  	  
adaptation and mitigation had become a major policy priori-
ty for the BC provincial government, and this is reflected in 
all annual reports and service plans that have been published 
since then. The Ministry of Transportation of Ontario has not 
published annual reports since 2003-2004, although the 
same emphasis on climate change adaptation and mitigation 
priorities can be seen in the publication of numerous cli-
mate-related policy documents since 2008, all of which place 
a heavy emphasis on transportation policy domains (see for 
example Ontario, 2009). At the executive level, climate 
change (and especially climate change issues in the transpor-
tation policy domains) has appeared in all of the Throne 
Speeches of both the BC and Ontario governments since 
2007. It is evident that the provincial executives in these two 
jurisdictions wish it to be known that climate change initia-
tives are now important policy considerations in many areas, 
including transportation. This represents a major expansion 
in policy mandate for these two provinces’ ministries of 
transportation, who must now adjust to this change in policy 
direction by incorporating climate change requirements in 
their operations. 
But do the ministries of transportation of British Colum-
bia and Ontario have the resources to meet the policy re-
quirements of their new climate change mandates? Re-
sources can refer to financial capital, but they can also mean 
quantity and experience of personnel. For the purposes of 
analyzing policy capacity, the most important resource is the 
quantity and experience of policy staff within the ministry of 
transportation. A reasonable metric for this resource could 
therefore be the dollars spent on policy-related staff salaries, 
as this will take into account the number of staff, as well as 
their levels of education, experience and responsibility (as 
better trained, more experienced, more important policy 
personnel will likely be paid higher salaries).  
 
Figure 2. Policy Salary Resources for BC and Ontario Ministries 
of Transportation, 1998-2010 
 
 
BC Ministry of Trans-
portation policy 
salaries as a percent-
age of BC Ministry of 
Transportation total 
salariesa 
Ontario Ministry of 
Transportation policy 
salaries as a percent-
age of Ontario Minis-
try of Transportation 
total salaries 
1998 / 1999 1.96% 2.96% 
1999 / 2000 2.12% 3.47% 
2000 / 2001 2.32% 3.45% 
2001 / 2002 2.80% 3.76% 
2002 / 2003 0.49% 3.68% 
2003 / 2004 0.63% 4.92% 
2004 / 2005 0.71% 5.64% 
2005 / 2006 0.72% 4.81% 
2006 / 2007 1.08% 4.79% 
2007 / 2008 1.31% 4.00% 
2008 / 2009 1.07% 4.28% 
2009 / 2010 0.94% 4.49% 
  
a  In BC, the Fund report lists salaries and employee benefits for “policy 
and legislation” for the Ministry of Transportation from fiscal year 
2002-2003 onward. Before 2002-2003, the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund report does not list a policy-specific line item. Its nearest 
equivalent is “highway planning and major projects”. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Figure 2 tabulates policy salary data for British Columbia 
and Ontario, as compiled directly from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund reports from the provincial ministries of 
finance.20 Figures 3 and 4 display these data as a bar chart, 
where the trends can be more easily seen. In order to elimi-
nate the effects of inflation, the amount of money spent on 
policy-related salaries within the ministry of transportation 
was divided by the total spent on all salaries for the entire 
ministry for each year, and these numbers are expressed as 
percentages. Because of changes to the way BC accounted for 
policy expenditures in the Ministry of Transportation after 
2001-2002, it was necessary to divide the data into two 
charts.   
There are some trends that emerge from these data. 
Spending on policy-related salaries in the Ministry of Trans-
portation increased through the recession years of 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002 in both BC and Ontario, and then de-
creased in BC in the recession years of 2008-2009 and 2009-
2010. In both jurisdictions, policy spending was increased 
over a change in government, in BC from the NDP to the 
Liberals in 2001, and in Ontario from the Progressive Con-
servatives to the Liberals in 2003. In BC, total policy salaries 
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in the Ministry of Transportation have declined in each of the 
three years since climate change was introduced to the politi-
cal agenda. In Ontario, total transportation policy salaries 
have risen in each of these years. 
In relation to policy mandates, a more interesting picture 
emerges over a longer time-scale than the trends noted 
above. Between fiscal years 1998/99 and 2006/07, climate 
change was not on the political agenda in either Ontario or 
BC, and those provinces’ ministries of transportation were 
operating under a stable policy mandate - or even one that 
had been slightly reduced, as deregulation, increased market 
competition, sales of Crown assets, and a retrenchment of 
government intervention in the industry all became goals for 
transportation policy. During this time, spending on policy-
related salaries within these two ministries of transportation 
fluctuated as expected: increasing and decreasing according 
to business and electoral cycles, with identifiable short-term 
trends emerging but with no clear overarching long-term 
direction. From 2007/08 onwards, climate change had be-
come (and continues to be) a major policy priority for these 
two provinces, with some emphasis on the relationship be-
tween climate issues and the transportation sector. If trans-
portation policy capacity were to match the demands of the 
expanding mandates required by climate action, policy sala-
ries in the ministries of transportation should be expected to 
have risen since 2007/08. 
This is not, however, exactly what has happened. Despite 
the advancement of climate change as a provincial priority, 
spending on policy-related salaries in the BC Ministry of 
Transportation fell every year since its high point in 
2007/08. This indicates that the economic climate in those 
years may have been a more important driver of policy ca-
pacity resources than the expanding mandate of climate 
change. In Ontario, policy salary spending in the Ministry of 
Transportation increased in the years since climate change 
was first introduced as a policy priority - but this is a mar-
ginal increase, since its current level of 4.5% of total Ministry 
of Transportation salaries is still lower than it was for several 
years and considerably less than the peak of 5.6% that it 
reached in 2004-2005. 
In short, policy resources in the ministries of transporta-
tion of British Columbia and Ontario have not matched these 
ministries’ expanding mandates in recent years. Despite 
significant political emphasis on the importance of climate 
action, these two provincial governments have not increased 
the resources that would be required for effective policy 
capacity in this area. This could be an indication that the 
established policy paradigm in the transportation sector is 
too inflexible to adapt to the demands of the newer climate 
change policy regime that has been layered on top of it. 
 
Interview findings  
 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with seven mid-
level and senior policy managers within the BC and Ontario 
provincial governments. This small sample size is repre-
sentative of the fact that in both of these jurisdictions, a 
relatively small number of individuals are dedicated to sup-
porting policy formulation at the intersection of the trans-
portation and climate change subsystems. To encourage 
candour, every attempt has been made to preserve the ano-
nymity of our interview subjects. Therefore, direct quotations 
cannot be attributed to particular individuals, and position 
titles cannot be identified. 
Interview subjects were asked to evaluate policy capacity 
in their departments and ministries, and to describe any 
changes in policy capacity that they have observed over time. 
They were asked about challenges in creating climate change 
policy for transportation, and about the effect of political 
priorities on policy advice. They were also asked for their 
assessment of policy trends in transportation over the past 
decade and to comment on what effect this might have on 
climate action. Nearly all of our interview subjects volun-
teered at least some relevant information that was not direct-
ly queried. While their policy and political orientations may 
have varied, our interview respondents were largely in 
agreement about the topics we discussed, suggesting a signif-
icant degree of consensus. This is especially pertinent in light 
of the fact that combined, our subjects represent four differ-
ent ministries in two provincial governments. 
 
Considering Policy Capacity 
Our interview subjects saw themselves mainly as profession-
al policy analysts. They described their role as that of re-
searching and presenting policy options to elected leaders, 
rather than serving as decision makers themselves. In their 
view, politicians present a policy directive and then ask civil 
servants to investigate the means and financial feasibility of 
making that directive a reality - including weighing parallel 
options for achieving the main goal, how much these options 
would cost, the benefits and drawbacks of each, and so on. 
The civil servants prepare a menu of policy options and then 
communicate that back to government leaders, who then 
decide which option to choose - if any - at their complete 
discretion. Once a decision has been made, the initiative 
returns to the bureaucrats who work on advising the gov-
ernment on how to best implement that policy decision. 
This Weberian understanding of the chain of command 
has important implications for our assessment of policy 
capacity. A majority of our respondents were quite unequivo-
cal that political initiative was the most important influence 
on policy capacity. Several pointed out that BC’s Climate 
Action Secretariat was able to accomplish more, had more 
fiscal resources, and more attention from other departments 
when it reported directly to the Office of the Premier.21 This 
implies a deferential attitude towards resolving many politi-
cal conflicts, such as those that can arise between goals and 
instruments in policy making. In other words, when it comes 
to making difficult choices between contending policy para-
digms, policy analysts generally do what elected leaders 
demand of them, and require political leadership to validate 
policy decisions. This mode of operation would tend to limit 
opportunities to alter entrenched policy paradigms, and 
would make it harder to advance initiatives in a layered 
policy context such as that found when climate action is 
added to the transportation subsystem’s policy agenda. 
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Some interview respondents suggested that they would 
be able to improve the policy capacity of their departments 
by hiring some more policy analysts with specialized tech-
nical knowledge to dedicate to some very specific policy 
development tasks, since the staff currently on hand is most-
ly composed of policy generalists. When asked to elaborate, 
they noted that some of the policy issues and options rele-
vant to climate change mitigation in the transport sector are 
so technical and demanding that they would benefit greatly 
from having some staff with specialized experience to work 
on them. However, we do not have sufficient data in this 
study to determine if this is a situation that is unique to 
transportation or if it is an issue that is common to other 
instances of layered policy goals and instruments. 
 
Policy Inhibitions 
All of the interview subjects acknowledged that the most 
widely used instruments for dealing with climate change in 
the jurisdictions that have shown considerable success such 
as Sweden (Sarasini, 2009), including increased regulation, 
enforcement of emissions standards, and strong stimuli to 
reduced dependence on fossil fuels, present a serious chal-
lenge to policy makers in the current transportation policy 
paradigm, which emphasizes deregulation and market au-
tonomy. In addition, many respondents identified expanding 
roadway infrastructure as a transportation policy that is 
clearly at odds with the goals of climate change mitigation. 
However, the vast majority of respondents claimed that 
ultimately, climate policy and transportation goals could be 
compatible. They mostly suggested that the answer lies with 
climate policies that make use of market mechanisms - such 
as carbon trading regimes. In fact, carbon pricing mecha-
nisms, including carbon trading, carbon taxes, and intergov-
ernmental efforts like the Western Climate Initiative were 
cited by all respondents as the best policy option for advanc-
ing climate action in transportation. Some respondents went 
further and identified ways that climate policies could be 
“sold” to the private sector: by engaging them in sectoral 
working groups that build their input into future policy de-
velopment, by slowly phasing in policies that would prove to 
be costly to business otherwise, and by offsetting financial 
costs arising from new climate-related regulation by reduc-
ing regulations in other areas of transportation or even other 
sectors entirely outside the transport sector.  
What this indicates to us is that the marketized transpor-
tation policy paradigm is so well entrenched that all efforts to 
mitigate or to adapt to climate change must either be re-
framed to accommodate transport’s policy goals or be backed 
by the kind of political leadership that our respondents iden-
tified as being necessary to re-prioritize policy goals. Until 
such political leadership determines otherwise, the most 
effective climate change policy instruments are those that 
incorporate the preferred policy goals of the transport sector: 
marketization, increased private sector competition, deregu-
lation, and so on. As one interview subject commented, “We 
don’t use the heavy hand of regulation much anymore”. 
 
Discussion/Conclusions 
 
The transportation sector in BC and Ontario operates in an 
entrenched policy paradigm in which private sector competi-
tion is promoted and government intervention is discour-
aged. This presents significant challenges for climate change 
policy initiatives in transportation, since the most effective 
climate policy options may require influencing unfettered 
market activities through some form of enhanced regulation. 
In the meantime, climate and transportation policy overlap 
in layers, where policy incapacity is institutionalized by the 
conflict engendered by competing paradigms. Policy analysts 
must attempt to frame climate action instruments in the 
language and methods that are compatible with transporta-
tion goals - and in this effort, carbon pricing mechanisms are 
seen to be the most promising policy instruments for taking 
action on climate in the transport sector. Either they could be 
the vanguard instruments that prompt a reassessment of the 
role of regulatory policy instruments, or they could prove to 
be false starts in the effort to reconcile climate and transport 
policies. The result is likely to depend on the degree and 
nature of political leadership that is blended with other ele-
ments of policy capacity. 
This paper has examined the collision of a long estab-
lished policy domain and a more recent problem that has 
made it onto the policy agenda. We have explored the policy 
process in a situation where new and old policy subsystems 
overlap - a scenario that is not well-described in the public 
policy literature. Our interview research and content analysis 
of policy documents supports the finding that the layering of 
two conflicting policy paradigms has resulted in an institu-
tionalized inhibition that limits the capacity of the subsystem 
to attain identified goals. We have also found that public 
policy analysts in the civil service believe that the capacity to 
attain new goals within layered policy subsystems can be 
enhanced by greater leadership offered by elected officials. 
Further research could benefit from exploring the under-
standing of those “political masters” regarding their role in 
managing the integration of the policy layers that will affect 
action on climate change. Direct interviews with elected 
officials were not undertaken for the present study, because 
the objective here was to examine the perspective of policy 
analysts in evaluating policy capacity in the layered areas of 
transportation and climate change. However, future studies 
could expand and deepen this analysis by considering the 
perspective of elected leaders in the policy process and the 
effect of political direction on capacity in layered policy are-
as. 
The level of complexity can rise quickly, as more policy 
areas are considered. Since climate change is cross-cutting, it 
is certain that climate action policies are influenced by many 
more policy subsystems than just transportation alone. Fur-
ther research is required to investigate the interactions be-
tween climate change and other policy areas in order to make 
more robust conclusions about the role of political leadership 
in catalyzing policy capacity. 
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Endnotes 	  
1  For an overview of the current predominant theories of the 
policy process, see Nowlin, 2011. 
2  Transportation, and specifically, railways and canals, was and 
continues to be a foundational part of the mythology of Canadian 
confederation. Both the maritime provinces’ and British Colum-
bia’s accession to confederation hinged on the promise that they 
	  
would be connected to the rest of the country by rail - the Mari-
times through the Intercolonial Railway and BC through what la-
ter became Canadian Pacific (Dyck, 2008: 51-52). 
3  For example, Sweden (Sarasini, 2009: 636). 
4  In this study, we did not interview elected officials. However, 
communication between the elected decision-making level of go-
vernment and the permanent bureaucracy is an essential aspect 
of policy capacity. Therefore it may prove exceedingly useful to 
query elected leaders directly to determine their perspective on 
policy capacity in a particular department, the policy process in 
general, and links or conflicts between layered policy issue areas. 
While this may be one obvious limitation in the present study, 
we believe that this is could be a promising area of future scho-
larship. 
5  It is important to note that while policy capacity usually refers to 
policy inputs and not outputs, policy language that promotes 
private sector involvement (such as deregulation or alternative 
service delivery) almost exclusively focuses on policy outputs 
and not inputs. The potential input of the market into the policy 
process is left unspecified, although scholars have elaborated 
this dynamic previously (eg. Lindblom, 1977). 
6  Both directions; extends upwards as far as the political executive 
level, but downwards only as far as dedicated policy employees. 
7  The input of private sector analysts, whether through contracted 
research or policy partnerships, can fill part of this gap. Howe-
ver, it can also raise other issues, such as principal/agent di-
lemmas, international policy convergence, and complicated 
costing problems resulting from differing accounting practices. 
For an in-depth analysis of the impact of consulting on policy 
capacity, see Perl and White, 2002. 
8  The law was enacted but the carbon trading portion was im-
mediately suspended, pending wider acceptance of carbon tra-
ding by other Canadian jurisdictions and US states, just as BC 
has done.  
9  And even then, most of the law’s provisions relate to the public 
sector - although there are some sections that relate to consumer 
goods, and a section on private property sales that is not yet in 
force. 
10  The details of such a system are not, however, prescribed in the 
law. 
11  Prince Edward Island is the other one. 
12  For an overview and assessment of the cap and trade system 
proposed by the Western Climate Initiative, see Olewiler, 2008. 
13  See section 12.0.2, for example. 
14  Depending on how you count the emissions (full life energy cycle 
including infrastructure would make it the biggest, counting 
point of combustion emissions makes it the second biggest). 
15  Environment Canada (2008: 7), Table 1, “Summary of emissions 
and economic activity by sector, 1990 and 2006” shows that the 
Transportation sector was the highest producer of greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2006 at 159 Mt CO2 equivalent. It was number 
2 behind Heavy Industry and Manufacturing in 1990, but Trans-
portation greenhouse gas emissions outpaced Industry’s in the 
years in between 1990 and 2006 (also on this table, Fossil Fuel 
Production was second in 2006 at 158 Mt CO2eq, close behind 
Transportation -- but Fossil Fuels had the greatest percentage 
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increase since 1990, at 53%. By comparison, Transportation saw 
a 31% increase in greenhouse gas emissions in this time). 
16  See Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009 for a detailed analysis of 
the five stages of the policy cycle. 
17  Enacted 1996, but amended as recently as 2008. 
18  Kern and Howlett use the terms “coherent/incoherent” for policy 
goals and “consistent/inconsistent” for policy instruments. This 
allows them to present a clearer two-by-two matrix of the pos-
sible states of interaction (2009: 395-396). 
19  Even a mode of transportation that is 100% electric will have a 
carbon footprint: the manufacturing of vehicles, steel for rails, 
concrete and pavement all produce greenhouse gas emissions. 
20  BC’s Consolidated Revenue Fund data are available from the 
Office of the Comptroller General at 
http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/ocg/pa/10_11/Pa10_11.htm  (last ac-
cessed May 26, 2012). Ontario’s data are available at 
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/paccts/2010/ (last acces-
sed May 26, 2012). In BC, the Fund report lists salaries and em-
ployee benefits for “policy and legislation” for the Ministry of 
Transportation from fiscal year 2002-2003 onward (before 
2002-2003, the Consolidated Revenue Fund report does not list 
a policy-specific line item. Its nearest equivalent is “highway 
planning and major projects”, which is not exactly the same and 
was therefore treated separately. Still, a trend can be discerned 
from the data). For Ontario, the Consolidated Revenue Fund re-
port lists salaries and employee benefits for “policy and plan-
ning” for the Ministry of Transportation from 1998-1999 on-
ward. The Consolidated Revenue Fund is the account that tracks 
the total of all monies coming into the government through all 
forms of revenue and all the funds that leave the government 
through all expenditures in a given year. 
21  The Climate Action Secretariat is currently a part of the BC 
Ministry of Environment. 
